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03_Anti-Animal-Rights

a)  Animals & Our Political Communities

Imagining the Zoopolis

by Dan Hooley

Thanks to Jayme Dunlop for recording this lecture

Lecture notes transcribed from Dan Hooley’s powerpoint presentation

Reading: Donaldson, Sue and Will Kymlicka. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford University Press: 2011. chapters 1 and 3 (in course reader)


Some Background

• Published in 2011
• Shifts debate from animal ethics to political theory
• Canadian authors: Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

‘Nibbling at the Edge of Injustice’

• Animal advocacy movement is at an impasse
• Animal victories: Some legal limits to the most egregious abuse in animal agriculture
• The dark side: growing exploitation and suffering of animals
• Dwindling habitat for wild animals and growing meat production

What’s behind this impasse?

• The usual suspects: cultural and religious inheritance, selfish
desires, laziness, apathy, powerful vested interests and industry lobby groups, etc.
• Problems with traditional animal rights theory (ART)

What’s wrong with traditional ART?

• A ‘flat moral landscape’
• Exclusive focus on negative rights
• No account of positive, relational obligations

Conceptual and poli/cal consequences:

• Miss much of the complexity of our moral relations to animals
• Fails to speak to potential allies like conservationists and companion animal lovers
Why the focus on negative duties?

• Urgency of establishing negative rights
• Suspicious about the possibility of just relations between humans and other animals (ex. Gary Francione)
• Full abolition of animal ‘use’: On the view of some, a just society would no longer interact and live with other animals.

Problems with the (full) aboli/on approach

• Empirical problems: humans will always live among and interact with other animals
• Substantive problems: ignores the need for just relations with other animals (domesticated and non-­domesticated)

Expanding Animal Rights Theory

• Political turn: we need to think about our relations to other animals in political terms (citizenship, sovereignty, etc.)
• Expanding upon, not denying, Universal Basic Rights
• All conscious animals have these rights and these rights have far reaching consequences
• But we need to go beyond Universal Basic Rights
• Consider: Universal Human Rights, Citizenship Rights

Why Political Categories?

• We have a lot of different relations to different animals
• D/K think that only by employing political categories can we understand the distinctive claims different animals have upon us, and the different types of injustice we cause different animals

• Domesticated animals -> Fellow citizens
• Wild animals -> Sovereign Animal Communities
• Liminal animals -> Denizens

Animal Citizens? [picture of pig on trial in medieval Europe]

Objection

• This is Crazy Town. Animals cannot vote, they cannot participate
in political debate. They just don’t have the cognitive capacities to be citizens.

• D/K’s Reply: Misunderstanding of the nature of citizenship

The Different Functions of Citizenship

1. Rights to Nationality
2. Popular Sovereignty
3. Democratic Political Agency

• We cannot reduce citizenship to the third function, or only grant citizenship based on a narrow understanding of the third dimension of citizenship.
• This would rule out many human beings.
• So we can think of domesticated animals as citizens on at least the first two understandings. This isn’t crazy town.

Animal Political Agency?

• But D/K think animals can also exercise political agency. How?
• Enter Disability Movement & Disability Theory
• Citizenship for individuals with severe cognitive disability?
• Dependent Political Agency: Trustees & Collaborators who help construct and interpret these individuals preferences and interests
• Embodied Political Agency
• Opens the door for thinking of domesticated animals as capable of political agency

Practical Significance of Citizenship for Domesticated Animals

• Basic socialization
• Mobility / public space
• Duties of protection (legal rights and legal standing)
• Animal labour
• Medical care (social duty to provide health care to animal companions)
• Forms of political representation

Why only domesticated animal citizens?

• Proximity, intimacy, and sociability needed for dependent agency
• Not feasible, desirable, or in the interests of, wild animals or liminal animals
• The flourishing of these animals, D/K think, would not be advanced by citizenship

Wild Animal Sovereignty [photo of primate mother and infant]

Problems with traditional ART

• Injunction from traditional ART: ‘just leave them alone’
• Ignores the harmful ways human behavior can often indirectly affect wild animals
• Not helpful in negotiating what positive obligations we have towards wild animals

Understanding Animal Sovereignty

• Recognizing wild animals as being sovereign over their territory would mean accepting that we have no right to govern their territory or make unilateral decisions
• Why recognize animals as sovereign?
• Wild animals have a legitimate interests in maintaining social organization on their territory and their flourishing depends on this being protected

Practical Consequences of Animal Sovereignty

• Respect their territory: wild animals have a right to be where they are.
• End the expansion of human seelements into wild animal territories
• Minimize harm: we have an obligation to design our highways, shipping lanes, and other travel routes with animals in mind
• Not all human ac/vity violates sovereignty
• Enforcing animal sovereignty through proxy political representation

Liminal Animal Denizens [photo of raccoons]

Who are these ‘liminal’ animals?

• Problems with the wild/domestic dichotomy
• Liminal animals are those who have adapted to life amongst humans, without being under the direct care of humans
• Examples: squirrels, raccoons,rabbits, sparrows, pigeons, coyotes, rats, ducks, bats, deer, foxes, and many more!
• One result of this false dichotomy: humans often view these animals as invaders, or alien residents who don’t belong.

The Political Status of Liminal Animals

• These animals have no other place to go.
Many would not survive if forcibly removed.
• The challenge: their interests aren’t served by either the sovereignty model or the citizenship model.

Denizenship

• Denizenship is a sort of in-between political category. Consider human migrant workers.
• In the human case, denizenship involves certain rights and certain responsibilities.
• The interests of denizens constrain what political bodies can rightly do and create certain obligations to respect their interests.
• DK think we should view liminal animals as denizens.
They are not citizens, but their interests matter and should influence how we live, the law, and public policy.

Practical Consequences of Animal Denizenship: Negotiating Space

• Secure Residency: End eradication efforts.
• Take in to account the interests of liminal animals in how we design and build our urban dwellings
• Minimize conflict: barriers to initial entry, disincentives, reduced food supply, habitat corridors, safe zones
• Legal protections and anti-stigma efforts

Summing Up
Is the Zoopolis Utopian?

• Might be far off, but we need a vision of a just society to work towards
• Catalysts for positive change: climate change and the ‘clean food’ movement (meat/animal product alternatives)
• Current developments towards a zoopolis …

Some Theoretical Questions

• Do we need rights to argue for the zoopolis? Or can we secure the same conclusions on the basis of morally important interests?
• What do you make of the different obligations and responsibilities D/K think we have towards different animals?

Practical Questions

• Does the vision of a‘zoopolis’ – involving what just relations between humans and animals might look like – have practical advantages for animal advocacy?
• Can this vision help to broaden the base (conservationists,
animal lovers)?

b)

Lecture on Anti-Animal-Rights Theory

Agenda: [Slide 1]

1. Can Nonhuman Animals Feel Pain?
2. R. G. Frey’s Supposed Negation of Animal Interests
3. “Humanist” Denials of Speciesism
4. The Old Mental Inferiority Argument against Animal Rights
5. Humanism Improved: Background for Superiorism
6. The Superiorist Argument
7. Superiorism’s Stance on Mentally Disadvantaged Humans
8. Objections to Superiorism That Don’t Work
9. Defeating Superiorism
10. Does Humanism Show Kindness, Humaneness, or Anti-Cruelty? No
11. Common Weak Excuses for Speciesism
12. Questions and Discussion

1. Can Nonhuman Animals Feel Pain?

• science now agrees they do
• anatomical evidence, including genes
• behavioral evidence
• evolutionary advantage of feeling pain

2. R. G. Frey’s Supposed Negation of Animal Interests: [Slide 2]

One of his key arguments:

1. In order to have interests one must have desires.
2. In order to have desires one must have beliefs.
3. In order to have beliefs one must have language.
4. Animals have no language.
5. Therefore animals have no beliefs.
6. Therefore animals have no desires.
7. Therefore animals have no interests.
8. One needs interests to count morally.
9. Therefore animals do not count morally.

A response:

  • can have beliefs without language
    We should have no difficulty grasping that animals can believe something is present that they sense, even if they do not necessarily use words (although some nonhuman great apes can extensively use American Sign Language for the deaf)

    • Bernard Rollin: animals can think in terms of images
    • animals engage in deception requiring reflection on beliefs, not only having them
  • can feel desire for something imaged too

3. “Humanist” Denials of SpeciesismAnti-animal-rightists who deny they are speciesist:

  • R. G. Frey: “I take seriously the charge of speciesism; I think discrimination solely on the basis of species is wrong.” R. G. Frey, ““Animal Parts, Human Wholes,” in Biomedical Ethics Reviews—1987, eds. James M. Humber and Robert F. Almeder (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1987), p. 105.
  • Michael Leahy rejects speciesism is “in its purest form based…only upon the anatomical difference.” Michael P. T. Leahy, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 203.
  • Peter Carruthers: “for the purposes of morality, species membership is an irrelevant characteristic.” Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 52.
  • Michael Allen Fox: “speciesism or species chauvinism in its full-blown form is unacceptable from an ethical standpoint.” Michael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 89.
  • not hard to see why they reject bare speciesism: just because someone is of a different species does not mean we have a licence to harm them (Sztybel, “Can the Treatment of Nonhuman Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?”)

4. The Old Mental Inferiority Argument against Animal RightsCriteria of moral standing by author:

AUTHOR CRITERIA
Aristotle rationality
Thomas Aquinas rationality
Immanuel Kant rationality
G. W. F. Hegel rationality
Bonnie Steinbock intelligence, moral agency
Richard Watson intelligence, reason
Meredith Williams rationality, sense of past and future, ability to have a cultural life, ability to make sense of interests informed by morality
L. B. Cebik ability to claim rights, self-concept
Ruth Cigman self-concept
Peter Miller richness of life
Alan Holland autonomy, rationality, self-consciousness
Carl Cohen moral agency, moral community
Michael Allen Fox critical self-awareness, ability to utilize concepts in complex ways and use sophisticated languages, ability to manipulate, ability to reflect, ability to plan, ability to deliberate, ability to choose, ability to accept responsibility for acting, ability to form a life plan, ability to self-actualize
R. G. Frey richness of life
A. I. Melden moral agency
Michael Leahy language, moral agency moral vocabulary
David DeGrazia richness of life

features of all these views that discriminate on the basis of mental abilities:

  • intuitionist: completely dogmatic
  • never say how lacking trait gives licence to do violence

5. Humanism Improved: Background for Superiorism

reasons for superiorism:

  1. Make the strongest case for speciesism, and show it still fails
  2. Weed out animal rights theories and objections to speciesism that do not work
  3. Try to provide understanding for why speciesism seems so intuitive to so many
    people, or to explain our cultural landscape.

favors beings more associated with good in two ways:

  1. more good in their own lives
  2. ability to create more good in the lives of others

other notes:

  • those with less good in their lives do not have no moral standing, but less moral standing
  • has been called strongest version of anthropocentrism by three prominent animal ethicists:
    “No object really interests us but man, and in man only his superiorities…” Ralph Waldo Emerson

    • L. W. Sumner, utilitarian, University of Toronto
    • Evelyn Pluhar
    • Michael Allen Fox

list of goods better to have than to lack: [Slide 3]

  1. Affectionate relations (with mentally disabled, antiques, nature preserves, art objects, cultural foods, collectibles, etc.)
  2. Artistic or creative endeavor
  3. Autonomy
  4. Awareness of self
  5. Beauty
  6. Capacity for play (games, dancing, music, joyful motions, etc.)
  7. Cultural or societal interrelationships
  8. Exchange of goods and services (i.e., general reciprocity and economic productivity)
  9. Freedom
  10. Health
  11. Humor
  12. Intelligence (sometimes conceived less formally than rationality)
  13. Language usage (or perhaps advanced communication, as well; language is richer)
  14. Legal engagement
  15. Moral agency
  16. Physical prowess (strength, agility, speed, physical senses, rending power, endurance, sexual vigor, dexterity)
  17. Political participation
  18. Rationality
  19. Sentience
  20. Sociability (friendship and love)
  21. Spirituality (religious pursuits would be optional here; a consideration of spiritual questions, however skeptically, would be sufficient)

Note: will use the abbreviation “G” to refer to these goods [Slides 4 – 7]

6. The Superiorist Argument

  1. Substantial G is not only relevant to but also sufficient for assigning moral standing, since all those who substantially possess all sorts of G also have moral standing.
  2. G alone is relevant to determining moral standing, since morally, it is the very best such criterion that one could choose amongst all of the competing criteria, and this is true for the following reasons:
    So G is necessary for having full moral standing.

    1. That which is best is that which has the most good and the least bad.
    2. That which has the most good and lack of bad is richest.
    3. Therefore what is richest is best.
    4. Each aspect of G is a good, for it seems better to have than to lack such things.
    5. So G is richer than any more modest criterion of moral standing such as being alive, sentient, or a subject of a life.
    6. Ethics is a pursuit of the good, or “the good life,” and aspires to what is best.
    7. Therefore, morally, we should aspire to holding G as the best criterion of moral standing.
  3. Since G is both necessary and sufficient for full moral standing, it follows that those who have only some of the criteria count for something, since they exemplify some riches, but they will have less of a moral claim than those who more fully embody all of G.
  4. Nonhuman animals either lack G, or might only have a more or less impoverished realization of it, such as in the case of whales, apes, and dogs.
  5. Nonhuman animals—as well as plants, rocks, ecosystems, etc.—which utterly lack G have no moral standing.
  6. Those nonhuman animals who have some G, such as self-awareness, advanced intelligence, sentience, etc., have a degree of moral standing, but in many cases it might be so limited that it only constitutes a minor ethical consideration.
  • slogan: “The best for the best.”
  • better than stipulating criteria of moral standing, because an intriguing justificaiton is presented

[Slide 8 – see table comparing average dog, average human, and average Nietzschean “Super-Person” in the reading “Taking Humanism Seriously”, or see the PowerPoint for this lecture]Note some results of this comparison (everyone is invited to come up with his/her own list, interpretation of items, and estimates):

  • dog marginally partakes in goods of life, no substantial G, so no substantial
    consideration and no rights
  • rights are reserved solely for those who are entitled to substantial moral consideration
  • God would be supremely revered, Einstein much less revered, and mediocre humans would simply be respected
  • superiorism compatible with rights, utilitarianism, virtue theory, ethic of care
  • it is a theory of moral standing rather than an ethical theory

7. Superiorism’s Stance on Mentally Disadvantaged Humans

  1. Affectionate relations are one of the greatest goods in life that we should cultivate as much as possible.
  2. One of the greatest opportunities for affectionate relations are with direct kin or
    indirect kin as in fellow human kindred, whereas other examples include family
    heirlooms, historical sites, prized landscapes or ecosystems, collectibles, etc.
  3. Kinship with humans is enhanced over affectionate relations with animals for dogs for a variety of reasons relating to special interests:
    So it is in human interests to cultivate affectionate relations, but not with utility animals because that will lead to much less happiness for humans.

    1. they belong usually to human families whereas dogs do not necessarily
    2. oneself could end up mentally disabled although not a dog
    3. all species show much greater affection towards their own species and are more likely to be disaffectionate towards members of species that are the most different from one’s own species
    4. there would be special sympathy to families who have the tragedy of children without full mental capacities, whereas there could be no such special sympathy for dogs
    5. the greater status is self-reinforcing because it would result in institutions that would develop standards of care; this is important because it results in systematic treatment that must be consistent with the dignity of the public conscience; if the government fails to respond in a caring way then insofar as that is true it is a failed state, and not maximizing goodness as superiorism would maintain; maximizing the good has serious implications and certainly would not mean desecrating and underservicing affectionate relations
    6. they look like us and that inspires affectionate relations, as in children with their dolls, or film or magazine images and adults
    7. we may have affectionate relations towards the human genome because it normally creates such a great species; a recent appreciation but a real
      possibility nevertheless since it is an aspect of kinship which is often of special affectionate interest
    8. we can take satisfaction or joy in helping mentally disadvantaged people to cope and to live well for them
  4. Therefore we can have a strong moral status for mentally disadvantaged humans that excludes most nonhuman animals.

Notes:

  • this argument cannot be easily attacked without going after superiorism itself, since this is indeed a great and genuine human good
  • cannot say that affectionate relations is not a great good worth promoting (love, friendship)
  • cannot deny kin is one of the greatest opportunities for affectionate relations
  • cannot deny many unique enhancers for human affectionate relations
  • cannot insist that we must extend the same consideration to all nonhuman animals on superiorism, since they are inferior and are not always the best beings to form close affectionate ties with if we use animals, as is our right on superiorism
  • note that affection permits having regard for the dog and the mentally disabled themselves, and does not regard them as mere instruments
  • regarded non-violently and benefited if adopted into an affectionate relationship, but dogs have no rights and are allowed to be killed by the millions without protest and with general social indifference, and are allowed to be raised abusively by exploiters who have no affection for their charges whatsoever
  • because mentally disabled humans would receive among the greatest affectionate relations, they would be granted that status of honorary rights-holders, like dogs are considered honorary family members in the best of homes, only all of society would adopt these humans because of their enhanced status and kinship to all humans
  • there would be moral limitations to affectionate relations:
    • cannot oppress those not regarded with affection or with some disaffection
    • cannot favour pet theories or prejudices that we regard with special affection for whatever reason

8. Objections to Superiorism That Don’t Work

  1. Superiorism is speciesist.
    • does not discriminate on the basis of either species or species-characteristics
  2. Does not account for mentally disabled humans.
    • see above
  3. Superiorism lacks compassion.
    • superiorists care in proportion as G-beings are worth caring about
    • degrees of compassion
    • a welfarist view that requires “kind” treatment of nonhuman animals
    • compassion can also be occasioned for objects of affectionate relations, as in mentally disabled humans
  4. Humanism uses irrelevant and arbitrary criteria of moral standing such as being human, having rationality, etc.
    • G is relevant and not arbitrary to emphasize, because it is the business of ethics
      to promote the good
    • skin colour, by contrast, is indeed arbitrary and irrelevant
    • superiorism rejects racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, and all other forms of oppressing superior G-beings who happen to be human
  5. We should use being sentient or being alive as a criterion of moral standing.
    • these are bare and impoverished compared to all of the goods that G embodies
  6. Individuals are not responsible for the amount of G they have.
    • we are often uninterested in the cause or origin of worth, but it still matters, as in the weather
    • therefore it does not matter that there is no merit in having G-factors
  7. Humanism is selfish.
    • superiorism is altruistic, but has less regard for so-called “inferiors”
  8. Nonhuman animals often have superior abilities such as sensing, strength, agility, running, flying, etc.
    • the G-list accounts for all of these but animals still have insubstantial G
  9. Humanism embodies “might makes right”.
    • those rich in G may be weak like Stephen Hawking
    • appeals to rational argument about the good, not imposition by force
  10. Rationality can be misused, even for evil.
    • yes, but so can any good, and reason can be used for great good too
    • ethics must aim for best although some will of course turn to evil
  11. Superiorism would mean contempt for the poor.
    • not ruthless perfectionism
    • all normal humans have rights based on substantial degree of G
  12. Superiorism is contrary to non-violence.
    • humans are entitled to non-violence on this ethic
    • if animals lack substantial G, they do not deserve substantial respect, and hence no rights against violence
    • violence does not have the same significance in relation to all sentient beings
  13. We should equally consider all equivalent interests (Singer).
    • no simply consider interests as free-floating abstractions, but act for conscious beings, count interests for less if they occur in the lives of inferior G-beings
    • thus trivial human interests might overrule vital animal interests because humans have rights but animals with insubstantial G do not
  14. You can’t precisely measure G.
    • true, as Aristotle says, ethics is not a precise science
    • any reasonable estimate of G values will have the same broad result

9. Defeating Superiorism

  1. Not best in terms of consequences, instead of the good of all, makes choose between sentient beings, good-negating
    • which produces more good, choosing to affirm the good of two people or choosing between them? obviously the former
    • similar though less stark logic interwoven with superiorism, negating good of inferiors
    • best criteria of moral standing is sentience because allows pursuit of the good of all
  2. Does not recognize how sentience underlies all G-goods
    Superiorist altruism is perverse: helping those already rich in goods, and helping the least those who are most impoverished in goods; neglecting those more likely to be less happy and focusing on making those more likely to be happy even happier

    • anhedonic person would find all these goods to be useless, worthless, without interest or even undesirable
    • animals can equally have lives of joy or misery
    • none of us would consider agony or joy to be “insignificant” so would be hypocritical or speciesist to downgrade these for nonhumans in any way
    • Sztybel: “No sentient creature looms over another in terms of ability to feel joy or suffering. We are all on a common playing field.”
  3. “Superior” aliens could enslave or kill inferior humans on this logic

Note:

  • these objections sink all general appeals to human superiority as in people who just list traits animals really or just supposedly lack
  • superiorism is inferior in its promotion of what is good, and in terms of justice

10. Is Humanism “Kind”?

  • not kind to refrain from supporting the good of all, instead proposing to chip away at that or negate it to a large degree
  • not kind to glut those already rich in goods and neglect those who are not so rich
  • not kind to stack the deck in terms of goods as an illusion, pretending sentience is only a minor factor
  • also not kind if we look at the violence involved, as the following analysis
    reveals

[Slide 9]

Levels of Harmful Discrimination

Level 0: No Harmful Discrimination

Level 1: Comparatively Minor Harmful Discrimination

  • insults, not being fully accepted

Level 2: Major Harmful Discrimination

  • less access to food, shelter
  • poor quality food and life

Level 3: Very Major Harmful Discrimination

  • = “kindness”, “humaneness”, “anti-cruelty”, animal “welfare”? No, because humans would not at all be doing “well” at this level
  • forcible slavery to perform for amusement
  • killed for food, body parts, hunted down, experimented on
  • condition of kindness, no “unnecessary suffering”
  • main priority here is not animals doing “well” or would be level zero
  • imagine aliens with a doctrine of “human welfarism” but really we are treated at Levels 3 and 4

Level 4: Extreme Harmful Discrimination

  • Holocaust, harshest slavery, factory farming, extreme vivisection
  • same as Level 3 only no pretensions to “humane” treatment

11. Common Weak Excuses for Speciesism

  1. Humans should always have priority.
    • even if believe, easy not to eat or wear animals, not go to dolphin shows, support animal experiments while acting for humans
    • best to attend to everyone, speciesist not to
    • naked assertion of speciesism
  2. Animals cannot behave ethically towards us, so we owe them nothing.
    • then no rights for mentally disabled humans, assuming we are not moved by refutation of superiorism
    • but whatever anyone says, it is not best to deprive the helpless of rights
  3. Humans are natural omnivores?
    • what nature permits is no guide to morality, or violence would be fine
    • healthier to be vegan by far
    • our anatomy more like herbivore than carnivore
      • tiny canine teeth
      • no claws, soft little fingernails
      • move jaws side to side and grind using molars unlike carnivores
      • long digestive tract, low acid unlike short, high-acid guts of carnivores
      • no instinct to devour raw carcasses, sickened by sight of blood, intestines, etc.
  4. What about plants?
    • most agree not sentient
    • even if sentient:
    • would face dilemma about eating plants, not animals, and most would choose to save themselves over a broccoli plant
    • vegetarians consume ten times fewer plants
  5. Only saints are vegan.
    • non-violence not for saints alone
  6. Animals never know any better treatment.
    • we know though
    • does not excuse child abuse
  7. Animals are our property to do with as we will.
    • once true of humans, but human slavery was wrong
    • we don’t own animals’ experiences: the animals have their own experiences as no one else can
  8. Humans have souls but nonhuman animals do not.
    • how can you prove anyone has a soul?
    • if souls are psyches, animals have psyches too
    • ethnocentric: Jains, Hindus, many natives say animals have souls
    • Cardinal Bellarmine: If animals only have this life, they should be treated more kindly if anything (quoted in Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality)
  9. Vegans should not dictate their ways to others.
    • informing choices of individuals and working democratically with society
    • animals “dictated to” in slaughterhouses, etc.
    • respect for diversity does not include violence
  10. The Bible suggests that it is acceptable to eat meat.
    • Bible says punishable by death to eat on the mountains, come near a menstruating woman, engage in usury (Ezekiel 18:5-9)
    • Bible says we have dominion over animals, radah in Hebrew which means government as in the case of citizens, who have rights
    • grateful and careful stewards of nature, not contemptuous of divine creation
  11. “I am not violent towards animals.”
    • if hunted humans, killed to eat or wear skins, enslaved, experiment on we call that violence: speciesist, hypocritical language and thinking
  12. “I like the taste of meat.”
    • speciesist, not taking animals seriously
    • thoughtless, inconsiderate, ignorant
    • veganism is full of great tastes
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